Fidan at the Doha Forum: Türkiye’s Position on Gaza’s Next Phase

سفير تركيا

سفير تركيا

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At the Doha Forum on 6–7 December 2025, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan set out Türkiye’s position on the Gaza ceasefire and the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF). His comments at the forum and in an interview with Reuters addressed both the security arrangements and the political institutions Ankara believed they would need.

Türkiye had helped facilitate the US-backed ceasefire. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan joined the leaders of the United States, Egypt and Qatar in signing the Sharm el-Sheikh declaration on 13 October 2025. Ankara presented itself as a guarantor of the process and expressed readiness to contribute to the ISF, despite Israel’s opposition to Turkish armed personnel taking part.

1️⃣ 🧩 What did the Gaza plan envisage?​

The framework was part of President Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza conflict. Its first phase brought a ceasefire in October 2025 after two years of war. Discussions about the next phase covered:
  • An international force to help stabilise Gaza.
  • A Palestinian civilian administration and a trained, vetted Palestinian police force.
  • Demilitarisation, including the future of Hamas’s weapons and the dismantling of armed infrastructure.
The distinction between the agreed framework and Türkiye’s proposed sequencing matters. UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on 17 November 2025, authorised the ISF under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. This was a UN-authorised arrangement, rather than an ordinary UN-commanded peacekeeping mission. Its mandate included demilitarisation; it did not simply postpone that issue until every other part of the plan had been completed.

Separately, Reuters reported on 12 December that US officials expected representatives from more than 25 countries at a CENTCOM planning conference in Doha on 16 December. The discussions were to help settle the force’s command arrangements and other operational questions. Troop numbers, rules of engagement, accommodation, training and funding were among the practical issues surrounding the proposed deployment. The expected attendance figure was a contemporary planning estimate, not proof that all those countries had committed troops or that the arrangements were already settled.

2️⃣ 🇹🇷 What was Türkiye advocating?​

  • Civilian institutions before demanding immediate disarmament. In his 6 December Reuters interview, Fidan argued that a credible Palestinian administration and professional police force should be in place to make Hamas’s disarmament possible. He envisaged police personnel who were not Hamas members. His argument was that weapons could then be addressed within a wider political process, rather than treated as a demand detached from governance and security guarantees.
  • Implementation beyond a fragile ceasefire. Fidan warned that an international failure to move the agreement forward would have serious consequences for the world and for Washington. In Türkiye’s assessment, stopping the fighting without a workable political and administrative path risked a return to war.
  • A Turkish contribution to stabilisation. Ankara offered to take responsibility where needed, including through military, security, humanitarian, technical or logistical assistance. This expressed willingness to contribute; it was not an announcement that Turkish troops had been accepted or deployed. Fidan acknowledged Israel’s objection and said Türkiye was discussing the issue with other partners.

3️⃣ 🌍 Working between the parties​

Türkiye remained sharply critical of Israel’s operations in Gaza and accused Israeli policy of obstructing Palestinian unity and a durable settlement. Those were Ankara’s political assessments, rather than neutral findings binding on the other parties.

At the same time, Türkiye worked with Washington and regional partners to advance the ceasefire arrangements. Its contacts with Hamas and other Palestinian actors sought a gradual transfer towards civilian governance, backed by political and security guarantees.

For Ankara, a lasting outcome in Gaza also required a broader political settlement of the Palestinian question, based on two states. Reducing Israel’s direct role in administering Gaza and enabling Palestinians to govern their own affairs formed part of that objective. Achieving it depended on implementation and negotiations, rather than on Türkiye’s position alone.

4️⃣ 🛰️ The wider regional context: Syria and the Black Sea​

Syria. Fidan criticised the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for failing, in Ankara’s assessment, to make concrete progress towards integration into Syrian state structures. The 10 March 2025 agreement was approaching its year-end implementation deadline.

The possibility of renewed military action formed part of the surrounding warnings, but a missed deadline was not itself an announced automatic trigger for a Turkish operation. In the Ministry’s published 11 December interview, Fidan said he hoped renewed conflict would be avoided. On 18 December, he again said Türkiye did not want a return to military means, while warning that the relevant actors’ patience was running out. These later remarks clarify the risk discussed in the original account without attributing them all to one Doha speech.

Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye continued to pursue mediation and maritime security. Fidan stressed the importance of protecting Black Sea trade routes and avoiding attacks on commercial shipping that could widen the war. Ankara’s diplomatic engagement with both sides was part of that effort; it did not mean a safe corridor or comprehensive peace had already been secured.

5️⃣ 📌 What the December position amounted to​

Türkiye sought a central role as a ceasefire guarantor, a potential contributor to the ISF and an advocate of credible Palestinian civilian government and new police arrangements before expecting disarmament to succeed.

Its engagement in Gaza sat alongside its security policy in Syria and mediation efforts concerning Ukraine and the Black Sea. One political interpretation views this as an attempt to establish Türkiye as a regional power able to work between Western partners, Russia and the wider Muslim world. That is an analysis of Ankara’s positioning, rather than a guarantee that its preferred arrangements would be adopted.

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