سفير تركيا
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December 2025 brought renewed movement in defence relations between Türkiye and the United States. The US ambassador in Ankara confirmed that the two countries were discussing Türkiye’s wish to return to the F-35 fighter programme, years after its exclusion over the acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air-defence system.
This is an account of the position in mid-December 2025. Continued negotiations were not an agreement to readmit Türkiye or a confirmation that sanctions had been lifted.
Background: from partnership to exclusion
- Türkiye had been a partner in the F-35 programme, with Turkish companies manufacturing components. Turkish officials put its payments towards the programme at approximately US$1.4 billion.
- The exclusion and sanctions occurred at different stages. Washington announced Türkiye’s suspension and began its removal from the programme in July 2019, after S-400 deliveries began. The US imposed the related CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries and associated officials in December 2020. They were not both first imposed in 2020.
- Washington argued that operating the Russian system alongside the F-35 could compromise sensitive aircraft technology and allied security. Ankara considered its treatment unfair and maintained that the S-400 would remain separate from NATO systems.
What was happening in December 2025?
In a statement posted on 9 December 2025 and widely reported the following day, US Ambassador Tom Barrack said discussions were continuing about Türkiye’s wish to rejoin the programme and its possession of the S-400. He described the talks as unusually productive compared with the preceding decade and expressed hope for a breakthrough in the coming months.Barrack also emphasised the legal obstacle: Türkiye could not return while continuing to possess or operate the Russian system. This was a condition to be resolved, not an announcement that Washington had set it aside.
The statutory framework is significant. Section 1245 of the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 restricts F-35 transfers and associated support to Türkiye. Its waiver route requires a joint Defence and State Department certification addressing the absence of the S-400 and associated equipment or personnel, assurances against accepting it again, and other specified conditions. A warmer political relationship does not itself satisfy that process or guarantee renewed membership.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also sounded optimistic. In a 6 December 2025 interview with Reuters in Doha, he said the countries had started working on the sanctions issue and believed a way to remove them could be found soon. That was his assessment of the negotiations, rather than a completed decision to lift sanctions.
Türkiye’s S-400 position: no announced change
In comments reported on 12 December 2025, Turkish Defence Ministry sources said there had been no new development concerning the S-400. They said contacts with US counterparts continued over F-35 procurement, the removal of sanctions and obstacles, and Türkiye’s return to the programme.The immediate picture was therefore that Ankara still possessed the system, had announced no arrangement to return or dispose of it, and continued to argue that it would not be integrated into NATO’s defences. “No new development” should not be expanded into a claim that officials had ruled out every possible future negotiated solution.
The political and military dimensions
The dispute connects three wider issues:- Türkiye–US relations. Washington wants to protect F-35 technology and allied security. Ankara argues that restrictions on a major NATO ally obstruct defence cooperation and undermine the relationship. These remain the respective positions of the parties, rather than a settled shared assessment.
- Türkiye’s relations with Russia and the West. The Russian purchase demonstrated defence cooperation with Moscow, while the effort to regain access to the F-35 reflected the importance of Western strategic partnerships. Reading the two decisions as part of Ankara’s balancing policy is political analysis; it does not establish a single official motive for either purchase.
- Türkiye’s defence industry. The country was developing its own KAAN fighter while pursuing other aircraft options, including the F-16 and Eurofighter Typhoon. By December, the Typhoon track had progressed beyond preliminary interest: Türkiye and the UK had signed an agreement for 20 new aircraft on 27 October 2025. A future F-35 arrangement could offer technological and economic opportunities and deepen cooperation with Western partners, but would not automatically restore every previous industrial role or commercial benefit.
What did the news mean at the time?
As of the original account’s mid-December 2025 reference point, there was no announced final agreement or lifting of the relevant sanctions. There was a more encouraging negotiating atmosphere, which Barrack linked to the relationship between Presidents Erdoğan and Trump during Trump’s second term.A breakthrough could have mattered for Türkiye’s defence manufacturers, the wider aerospace economy and cooperation within NATO. Those were possible consequences of a future agreement, not outcomes already secured by the ambassador’s comments.
The door to discussing the F-35 had opened again. The S-400 remained the obstacle on the threshold.
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