سفير تركيا

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On 15 December 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan presented the AK Party’s Turkic World Vision document at an event in Ankara. It set out an agenda for closer cooperation between Türkiye and the wider Turkic world, including Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, alongside partners such as Hungary.

This was a party policy document launched by Erdoğan in his capacity as President and AK Party chairman. It should be distinguished from the Organisation of Turkic States’ separate Turkic World Vision 2040, adopted at its November 2021 summit. Hungary participates in the Organisation as an observer, rather than a full member.


1️⃣ 🌐 What was the vision intended to achieve?​

The document called for deeper economic links and cooperation in energy, transport, technology and defence. It also sought to strengthen the Organisation of Turkic States as a platform for regional political and economic coordination.

The broader ambition was to give the participating countries greater collective influence across Central Asia, the Caucasus and their connections towards the Black Sea and Europe. These were strategic objectives, rather than the immediate creation of a single market or a new binding alliance.

Erdoğan placed economic strategy at the centre of the vision. His argument was that trade, investment and practical integration give substance to political and cultural solidarity.


2️⃣ 💰 The economic agenda​

  • Energy and transport. The agenda envisaged stronger links between gas, electricity and transport networks connecting Türkiye with Central Asia. Modernising infrastructure and developing energy corridors were intended to strengthen Türkiye’s role as a route for oil and gas towards European markets. These ambitions require individual projects, financing and agreements; the launch did not mean all the proposed connections were already operating.
  • Trade and investment. Priorities included increasing trade between the countries, encouraging joint investment and developing shared financing mechanisms. Cooperation involving public investment institutions, funds and private investors formed part of that discussion. It was an invitation to deepen economic links, rather than an announcement that every proposed fund or investment vehicle had been established.
  • Technology and defence. The document supported closer industrial and technological cooperation, including sharing relevant Turkish experience with partner countries. Drones, radar and communications provide illustrative examples as examples of defence capabilities around which cooperation could develop. These examples should not be read as announcements of new procurement contracts or an unconditional transfer of controlled technology.


3️⃣ 🪖 The political dimension​

One political interpretation views the initiative as part of Türkiye’s effort to establish a leading role in the Turkic world and broaden its options in relations with Europe, Russia and the United States. Stronger ties with Central Asia and the Caucasus could provide an additional channel of influence alongside those existing relationships.

This interpretation sits within the wider context of Türkiye’s involvement in diplomacy concerning Ukraine, developments between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and energy issues in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.

It is an assessment of Ankara’s positioning. The other countries retain their own interests and foreign policies, and the document does not establish that they have accepted Turkish leadership or formed a common policy on every regional dispute.


4️⃣ 📌 Why this matters to readers following Türkiye​

  • Geopolitics. A stronger network linking Türkiye, Central Asia and the Caucasus could increase Ankara’s room for manoeuvre in its dealings with Moscow, Brussels and Washington. The effect depends on practical cooperation, rather than the publication of a vision alone.
  • Business and investment. Arab investors interested in Türkiye may see areas worth following in cross-border transport and energy projects, or partnerships bringing together a Turkish business, a partner in another Turkic state and a third investor. These are possible avenues for cooperation, not a guarantee of access, public funding or returns.
  • Türkiye’s wider identity. The initiative presents Türkiye as more than a bridge between East and West: it places the country at the centre of a network of cultural and economic relationships stretching from the Balkans towards Central Asia and China’s borders. This is a statement of political and cultural ambition, rather than a claim of sovereignty over that wider geography.
The vision provides a framework to revisit when Organisation of Turkic States summits take place or joint infrastructure projects are announced. Those developments will help show which ambitions move from policy statements into funded, agreed and operational projects.


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